Research graph
References from Matching for risk-taking: Overconfident bankers and government-protected banks. Local targets link to admitted publications; unresolved targets remain external evidence.
Corporate risk: CEO overconfidence and incentive compensation
2020 · External reference
CEO overconfidence and the value of corporate cash holdings
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.006 · 2019 · External reference
Matching firms, managers, and incentives
10.1086/679672 · 2015 · External reference
Restraining overconfident CEOs through improved governance: Evidence from the sarbanes-oxley act
10.1093/rfs/hhv034 · 2015 · External reference
Optimal investment, growth options, and security returns
10.1111/0022-1082.00161 · 1999 · External reference
Bailouts and the optimal taxation of bonus pay
10.1257/aer.103.3.163 · 2013 · External reference
Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.01.002 · 2014 · External reference
Are overconfident CEOs born or made? Evidence of self-attribution bias from frequent acquirers
10.1287/mnsc.1070.0830 · 2008 · External reference
Unresolved reference
2023 · External reference
Real options, irreversible investment and firm uncertainty: new evidence from U.S. firms
10.1016/j.rfe.2004.09.002 · 2005 · External reference
CEO optimism and forced turnover
10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.004 · 2011 · External reference
Econographics
10.1086/723044 · 2023 · External reference
Evidence for countercyclical risk aversion: An experiment with financial professionals
10.1257/aer.20131314 · 2025 · External reference
Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.003 · 2016 · External reference
Overconfidence and moral hazard
10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.001 · 2011 · External reference
The dynamics of overconfidence: Evidence from stock market forecaster
10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.001 · 2010 · External reference
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00171-x · 2002 · External reference
A multiplicative model of optimal CEO incentives in market equilibrium
10.1093/rfs/hhn117 · 2009 · External reference
Assortative matching with large firms
10.3982/ecta14450 · 2018 · External reference
Incentive pay and bank risk-taking: Evidence from Austrian, german, and swiss banks
10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.12.006 · 2015 · External reference
Incentive-based capital requirements
10.1287/mnsc.2016.2549 · 2017 · External reference
The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness
10.1016/j.jfi.2012.08.001 · 2013 · External reference
Why has CEO pay increased so much?
10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 · 2008 · External reference
Unresolved reference
2018 · External reference
Overconfidence, compensation contracts, and capital budgeting
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01686.x · 2011 · External reference
Learning to be overconfident
10.1093/rfs/14.1.1 · 2001 · External reference
Managerial overconfidence and bank bailouts
10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.019 · 2020 · External reference
Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate governance
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01412.x · 2008 · External reference
Managerial attitudes and corporate actions
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.010 · 2013 · External reference
The impact of public guarantees on bank risk-taking: Evidence from a natural experiment
10.1093/rof/rft014 · 2014 · External reference
Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies
10.1093/rfs/hhq114 · 2011 · External reference
Time varying risk aversion
10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.007 · 2018 · External reference
CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.009 · 2011 · External reference
Bank bonuses and bailouts
10.1111/jmcb.12090 · 2014 · External reference
Regulatory and bailout decisions in a banking union
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106300 · 2021 · External reference
Are overconfident CEOs better innovators?
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01753.x · 2012 · External reference
CEO overconfidence and financial crisis: Evidence from bank lending and leverage
10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.04.007 · 2016 · External reference
Unresolved reference
2016 · External reference
Are bigger banks better? Firm-level evidence from Germany
10.1086/714120 · 2021 · External reference
Executive overconfidence and compensation structure
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.022 · 2016 · External reference
What is CEO overconfidence? Evidence from executive assessments
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.023 · 2022 · External reference
Unresolved reference
2023 · External reference
Unresolved reference
2017 · External reference
The effect of uncertainty on investment: Some stylized facts
10.2307/2077967 · 1996 · External reference
Bank systemic risk and CEO overconfidence
10.1016/j.najef.2019.03.011 · 2020 · External reference
CEO overconfidence and corporate investment
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x · 2005 · External reference
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction
10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 · 2008 · External reference
Bank bailouts, international linkages, and cooperation
2013 · External reference
Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from stakeholder commitments
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.008 · 2018 · External reference
Overconfidence and investment: An experimental approach
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.002 · 2017 · External reference
Bank monitoring and CEO risk-taking incentives
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.12.003 · 2018 · External reference
Biased interpretation of performance feedback: The role of CEO overconfidence
10.1002/smj.3138 · 2020 · External reference
Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time
10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.016 · 2011 · External reference
Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.019 · 2013 · External reference
Biased interpretation of performance feedback: The role of CEO overconfidence
10.1002/smj.3138 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Overconfidence and moral hazard
10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.001 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.019 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Bank monitoring and CEO risk-taking incentives
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.12.003 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Regulatory and bailout decisions in a banking union
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106300 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.009 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.01.002 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Overconfidence and investment: An experimental approach
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.002 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
CEO overconfidence and the value of corporate cash holdings
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.006 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
The dynamics of overconfidence: Evidence from stock market forecaster
10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.001 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Managerial overconfidence and bank bailouts
10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.019 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness
10.1016/j.jfi.2012.08.001 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction
10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time
10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.016 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
CEO optimism and forced turnover
10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.004 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Managerial attitudes and corporate actions
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.010 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
CEO overconfidence and financial crisis: Evidence from bank lending and leverage
10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.04.007 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Executive overconfidence and compensation structure
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.022 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.003 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from stakeholder commitments
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.008 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Time varying risk aversion
10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.007 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
What is CEO overconfidence? Evidence from executive assessments
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.023 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Incentive pay and bank risk-taking: Evidence from Austrian, german, and swiss banks
10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.12.006 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Bank systemic risk and CEO overconfidence
10.1016/j.najef.2019.03.011 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Real options, irreversible investment and firm uncertainty: new evidence from U.S. firms
10.1016/j.rfe.2004.09.002 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00171-x · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Matching firms, managers, and incentives
10.1086/679672 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Are bigger banks better? Firm-level evidence from Germany
10.1086/714120 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Econographics
10.1086/723044 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Learning to be overconfident
10.1093/rfs/14.1.1 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
A multiplicative model of optimal CEO incentives in market equilibrium
10.1093/rfs/hhn117 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies
10.1093/rfs/hhq114 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Restraining overconfident CEOs through improved governance: Evidence from the sarbanes-oxley act
10.1093/rfs/hhv034 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
The impact of public guarantees on bank risk-taking: Evidence from a natural experiment
10.1093/rof/rft014 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Optimal investment, growth options, and security returns
10.1111/0022-1082.00161 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
CEO overconfidence and corporate investment
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate governance
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01412.x · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Overconfidence, compensation contracts, and capital budgeting
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01686.x · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Are overconfident CEOs better innovators?
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01753.x · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Bank bonuses and bailouts
10.1111/jmcb.12090 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Why has CEO pay increased so much?
10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Bailouts and the optimal taxation of bonus pay
10.1257/aer.103.3.163 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Evidence for countercyclical risk aversion: An experiment with financial professionals
10.1257/aer.20131314 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Are overconfident CEOs born or made? Evidence of self-attribution bias from frequent acquirers
10.1287/mnsc.1070.0830 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Incentive-based capital requirements
10.1287/mnsc.2016.2549 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
The effect of uncertainty on investment: Some stylized facts
10.2307/2077967 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
Assortative matching with large firms
10.3982/ecta14450 · ExternalCitation · doi-reference
