No appeal to moral status required: rethinking the argument for the moral advantage of stem cell-based embryo models in research

Abstract Stem Cell-Based Embryo Models (SCBEMs) have been welcomed enthusiastically because they would allow the study of specific phases of human embryonic development without resorting to embryos produced in vitro. This enthusiasm is based on the idea that research on such models is morally less problematic than research on human embryos. However, this position has recently been challenged, as some authors argue that there are no good reasons to attribute a different moral status to SCBEMs compared to embryos, and the focus on such models risks obscuring an appropriate evaluation of embryonic experimentation rather than representing a genuine moral advancement. In light of this disagreement, I discuss what I call the Argument for the Moral Advantage of SCBEMs and aim to defend it against recent criticisms. I first present the standard version of the argument and argue that it assumes embryos possess direct moral status based on their potential to become persons. Then, after discussing criticisms of the standard version, I explore revising the argument. I first consider relying on the embryos’ symbolic moral value; after dismissing this move, I introduce a revised version of the argument based on the pro tanto minimization of moral conflicts, rather than on embryos’ moral status or value. After defending the revised argument against several objections, I finally discuss regulatory issues concerning SCBEMs research.