Abstract
Abstract
The idea that the outcomes of scientific research – even when pursued with entirely positive intentions – can be misused to cause large-scale harm is not new. More recent, however, is the tendency to use the expression
dual-use research
or
technology
to describe this phenomenon. As noted in the literature, this concept is far from unambiguous, as it is employed in various contexts and for different purposes. Originally, the term acquired a technical meaning in the field of non-proliferation and export control. It was later introduced into the discourse of research ethics, particularly in connection with research security and the responsibilities of scientists. More recently, the term has (re)appeared for example in EU legal and policy documents, taking on an industrial connotation that emphasizes the potential synergies between civilian and military research and development. This conceptual ambiguity entails the risk that discussions about the ethical and legal issues raised by dual-use technologies may be undermined by a fallacy of equivocation. In this article, after briefly outlining the origins and evolution of the concept, I argue for the importance of distinguishing at least two interpretations of dual use: one (seemingly) morally neutral and one (explicitly) value charged. I will examine the practical implications that follow from adopting one interpretation over the other, and show how each perspective enables a clearer approach to addressing specific – though often interconnected – ethical and legal issues. In conclusion, I will deal with the question whether dual-use assessments express factual or value judgments.