Accidental architects: self-effacing objectives in international relations

Abstract International relations scholarship typically assumes that states achieve their objectives through deliberate, strategic action. This article develops an alternative account: many state objectives are self-effacing – they cannot be attained directly, but only as byproducts of other pursuits. I argue that this dynamic is especially likely under interdependence, where networks emerge through the voluntary participation of new entrants. Under such conditions, overt bids for future leverage provoke resistance, hedging, and duplication. Where durable structural advantage does materialize, it tends to arise indirectly, as the unintended result of principled state commitments, or of nonstate actors pursuing goals unrelated to geopolitics. I illustrate the argument through cases in global finance and global supply chains, showing how leverage repeatedly emerges from processes no state intended. Finally, I turn to foreign influence campaigns to demonstrate how states can nonetheless design conditions conducive to ‘welcome byproducts.’ Yet doing so requires relinquishing some control. The result is a reframing of strategy in international relations: dominance proves most likely when it is not openly pursued.