The problem of intelligence in International Relations theory

Abstract States spy. Yet International Relations (IR) theory has no systematic account of intelligence. I make three arguments. First, realist IR theories are too narrow to theorize intelligence as the complex social practice it is. Realism renders intelligence invisible or reduces it to a single instrumental raison d’état logic. Second, the English School’s societal approach opens the way for theorizing intelligence as instrument of normative practice. Extending Adam Watson’s raison de système to intelligence, grounded in the intelligence–diplomacy relationship and corroborated by an emerging lex specialis , establishes that intelligence helps constitute international society rather than merely operating within it. Third, the societal approach does not exhaust the subject. Raison d’humanité names a third logic – intelligence in the service of justice – and critical approaches deepen the account by asking whose survival, whose order, and whose humanity the framework serves. The three logics are in permanent tension and tend toward a rough hierarchy, reflecting political choice rather than structural necessity. This analysis raises a question for future research: whether intelligence qualifies as a primary institution of international society – a practice whose place is not at the margins of world politics but at its center. Where there are spies, there is society.