Abstract
Contemporary armed conflicts increasingly unfold through communication networks, satellite systems, broadcasting facilities, cloud services, and digital platforms that support both military operations and civilian life. That dual-use character creates acute difficulties for the law of armed conflict because information infrastructure is rarely confined to a single physical object or a single institutional user. The difficulty is not that existing doctrine is unavailable, but that ordinary object-based categories can conceal the way information functions are shared. The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions remain applicable to attacks on dual-use information infrastructure, but their application requires a more functionally precise analysis. A functional interdependence approach asks whether the operation is directed at the smallest feasible functional unit with military relevance, how civilians depend on that function, which reverberating and informational effects are reasonably foreseeable, and whether less harmful alternatives are available. Drawing on foundational targeting scholarship, cyber-specific manuals and guidance, state practice, and case studies from the Russia-Ukraine war, the analysis shows how this approach can discipline military-objective determinations and proportionality assessments without creating a new legal category or abandoning existing doctrine. The resulting framework is intended for assessing broadcasting, telecommunications, satellite, and cyber operations in conflicts where civilian and military information systems are deeply intertwined.