Abstract
For half a century, armed conflict in the Middle East was synonymous with oil price shocks. This article asks whether that relationship survived the US shale revolution. Using an event study of 15 major Middle East conflict events between 1990 and 2025, we document a pronounced decline in the oil market's price response to regional conflict: the mean absolute cumulative abnormal return in Brent falls by roughly two-thirds after 2014 (exact permutation p = .03); the effect is concentrated in Brent, the global seaborne benchmark. Every large pre-2014 response involved an actual or imminent loss of supply, whereas the post-2014 sample consists almost entirely of threat events; the claim therefore concerns the pricing of conflict threats, not of realised supply destruction. Volatility responds even where prices do not: major post-2014 conflicts still raise realised and option-implied volatility significantly, a pattern we summarise as risk without premium. We associate the change with the joint expansion of price-elastic US supply, OPEC spare capacity and strategic reserves; because these buffers expanded together, this supply-side interpretation is a structural narrative disciplined by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as an out-of-sample counterfactual, not an identified causal estimate.