Abstract
The purpose of the present study is to test the hypothesis alluded to by Tullock, within the context of defensive rent‐seeking efforts developed by others (e.g. McChesney). Here, we test the idea that defensive rent seeking efforts (or rent‐defending) to maintain the status quo augment offensive rent‐seeking (all proxied by real campaign contributions to US House/Senate candidates, 1976‐1992) during federal budgetary climates of deficit‐cutting (budget‐balancing). When a panel estimator is properly used, our econometric evidence confirms our hypothesis. Evidence from a Parks regression technique suggests that total rent‐seeking is positively related to the amount of federal spending, as others have shown, but that rent‐seeking efforts increase when federal budget deficits are reduced, threatening existing spending patterns and rents. Perhaps an unintended consequence of deficit‐reduction efforts, holding government spending constant, is an increase in the size of the rent‐seeking industry.