Appointing a general manager in Sino‐US joint ventures

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine performance implications of general manager appointment in Sino‐US joint ventures, specifically whether there is a difference in outcomes when the appointment is made by the Chinese or American partner. Design/methodology/approach Using a structured questionnaire, data were collected from 94 managers representing US and Chinese partners in 67 international joint ventures (IJVs) based in China. Findings The results show that, when the general manager is Chinese rather than American, there is heightened conflict on daily personnel management issues, but not on strategic and contract issues, and the overall levels of partner satisfaction and relationship commitment decrease as well. Research limitations/implications The research was based on small sample size and cross‐sectional design. Originality/value This article focuses on the general manager appointment as a control mechanism and explores its link to IJV performance. It identifies daily/personnel issues as a source of conflicts that are associated with the right to appoint the IJV general manager.