Propaganda and thought work in the Mao era: Absoluteness, sharp transitions, and political instability

Abstract This paper elucidates the reasons behind Deng Xiaoping's initiation of political reform from a propaganda perspective by examining the features of Mao's propaganda and thought work and their implications for the Chinese Communist Party, analyzing cases such as the “Two‐Hundred Policy,” the “Anti‐Rightist Campaign,” propaganda campaigns related to the USSR, and the transformation of Lin Biao's image. It argues that Mao's propaganda and thought work, characterized by their absoluteness and sharp transitions, were detrimental to the stability of the communist regime. These characteristics led to widespread indifference, distrust, and even resistance toward the Chinese Communist Party among the Chinese populace since the late Mao era. China had entered a post‐trust era, marked by a growing tendency among the populace to preemptively view official messages as untrustworthy. To restore the party's credibility, Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in propaganda and thought work to address these shortcomings.