Abstract
In the first part of this article a conceptual framework for assessing the durability of negotiated peace settlements is developed. The framework elaborates on approaches that hold that dealing with issues of relative group status is central to the effectiveness of negotiated settlements. The dynamics of post-settlement competition, the negotiated rules that shape such competition, and the impact of competitive outcomes on inter-group status, whether adverse or positive, is explored. It is argued that peace settlements with rules that shape competition in such a way that both parity of outcomes and parity of esteem can be achieved will be more durable. Parity of esteem is achieved to the extent that competitive rules inhibit stakeholders from drawing invidious comparisons from competitive outcomes. The second part of the article comprises a case study of South Africa. A descriptive analysis is made of a particular set of rules that emanate from the 1993/96 negotiated settlement. The competitive arena is the employment market and the rules of affirmative action. The case study centers on a ruling in a case brought to the South African Labor Court by the Solidarity Trade Union. The case illustrates the emergence of invidious comparisons, the dynamics of in-group and out-group interaction, the construction and reconstruction of identities, and the shifting equilibrium of relative group status. In conclusion, it is found that the current rules shaping this competitive situation inhibit the emergence of parity of esteem.