Abstract
The organizational forms of infrastructure in China are divided into two categories, the traditional Public Procurement Model (PUB) model and Public–Private Partnership(PPP) model. The main difference is the separation or binding of the construction and operation phases. A systematic understanding is needed of how Chinese local governments choose between these two models. In this paper, we take public capital congestion and local government objectives as the entry point to study the effects of both on PPP choice. Firstly, by constructing an endogenous economic growth model under the PPP model, and comparing it with the model under the PUB model, this paper initially explains how the rise in public capital congestion affects the choice of the PPP by growth-oriented local governments. Then the data from prefecture-level cities from 2009–2018 are utilized to conduct empirical tests. We find that urban economic growth pressures have a positive effect on the choice of PPP when the congestion of public capital increases. Furthermore, the implementation of PPP is indeed conducive to economic performance, and its core mechanism is to provide more infrastructure (like roads) rather than tax competition. The PPP model is more sustainable. We are the first to employ both modeling approach and the empirical research to address the implementation of Public–Private Partnership in China. And we have systematically analyzed the conditions and results of PPP selection by local governments. It formulates the Chinese PPP theory.