Abstract
This research examined the key factors shaping China’s shifting approach to multilateralism in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), with a particular focus on the establishment of the Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC). The LMC represents a significant shift from China’s previous strategy of acting unilaterally as a hydro-hegemon, which granted it the power to build hydropower dams on the Mekong River without meaningful consultation with downstream neighbors. Utilyzing Jeffrey Taliaferro’s balance-of-risk theory, the analysis investigates how great powers adjust foreign policy in response to anticipated changes in the relative distribution of power within the international system and a state’s prospects. According to Taliaferro, states are more motivated by the fear of anticipated losses in their relative power than to anticipated gains. From this perspective, China’s move to establish the LMC was a calculated response to the increasing involvement of external actors in the GMS, which threatened its influence. China’s multilateral turn is best understood as a pragmatic, risk averse adjustment aimed at anticipating a relative decline in power in the near future if it maintained a unilateral approach. This research contributes to our understanding of how great power engage with regional institutions and demonstrates the importance of risk management in China’s water dipmomacy in mainland Southeast Asia.