Abstract
This article reads Peter Singer’s animal ethics as the extremity of utilitarianism. Singer’s decisive achievement is to extend moral consideration beyond the human species by insisting that comparable suffering must be considered equally, regardless of the being who suffers. Yet this achievement also reveals the limit of utilitarianism. Once animal lives are translated into commensurable interests, pleasures and pains, singular beings risk becoming interchangeable units within a general economy of welfare. Sentience breaks with the anthropocentric boundary of morality, but personhood reintroduces a cognitive hierarchy among living beings. In the same way, aggregation allows the suffering or death of an individual animal to be justified by a greater total benefit, while replaceability reduces life to a position that another life can occupy. Drawing on Nicole Shukin’s concept of animal capital, the article develops a materialist critique of the affinity between utilitarian calculation and capitalist administration. Contemporary animal industries do not simply deny animal suffering. They measure stress, regulate pain and improve welfare while continuing to own, breed, process and kill animals as commodities. Humane reform may therefore alleviate suffering while leaving the material structure of exploitation intact. What must be stressed is that sentience should function as the minimum threshold of moral urgency, not as the sole measure of value. A relational and materialist animal ethics must begin from the singularity, vulnerability and interdependence of living beings. The task is not to abandon Singer’s insight but to radicalise it beyond the calculus of suffering and towards animal liberation.