Abstract
Illocutionary Logic, as developed by Searle and Vanderveken, provides one of the most comprehensive formal models for representing speech acts. However, its inferential foundation relies on classical logic, whose Principle of Explosion limits the formal treatment of communicative phenomena involving contradiction. This study investigates whether the descriptive architecture of Illocutionary Logic can be preserved while replacing its classical inferential basis with the C₁ paraconsistent calculus proposed by da Costa. Using a formal reconstructive methodology, the original framework is reformulated without modifying its seven-dimensional representation of illocutionary force. Four representative pragmatic phenomena—emphatic pleonasm, irony, definitional obviousness, and contrastive conjunction—are analyzed to compare the behavior of the classical and paraconsistent approaches. The results indicate that the proposed reconstruction preserves contradictory informational structures without inferential trivialization, allowing pragmatic meaning to emerge through controlled non-explosive reasoning. The study argues that the explanatory limitations of classical Illocutionary Logic arise primarily from its consequence relation rather than from its descriptive model of speech acts. By integrating Illocutionary Logic with paraconsistent reasoning, the proposed framework extends the formal representation of natural language pragmatics while suggesting new possibilities for research in formal semantics, computational linguistics, and neuro-symbolic artificial intelligence.