Abstract
When accused of misconduct in their private or public lives, people choose whether to apologize or to defend their character or reputation. Previous experiments have found that when misconduct is severe or offends outgroup members, transgressors may benefit by defending themselves and denying culpability for wrongdoing. In this study, we explore whether these tendencies can successfully reduce politicians’ accountability for wrongdoing in the context of a U.S. congressional election. We constructed a novel dataset documenting Representatives’ public remarks in response the 1992 House Bank Scandal, during which Representatives from both major parties were accused of misusing funds. Contrary to predictions, conciliatory remarks were not associated with electoral failure among more severe House Bank “offenders.” Consistent with predictions, defensive remarks (refusals) lost their typical association with electoral failure when the incumbent’s party controlled the district. Results suggest that groups may allow their leaders to escape blame for wrongdoing and retain power.