Abstract
Felt presence (FP) refers to the experience of sensing another agent nearby despite theabsence of corresponding sensory evidence, and has been reported across neurological,psychiatric, and non-clinical populations. However, its potential phenomenological similarity andcontinuity with the common childhood experience of imaginary companions (ICs) have receivedlittle attention. The present study characterizes the spatial and perspectival features ofretrospectively reported childhood IC experiences, evaluates their parallels with thephenomenology of FP, and interprets these convergences within the theoretical framework ofbodily self-consciousness (BSC) and peripersonal space (PPS). Three theory-driven predictionswere tested using retrospective self-reports from a healthy adult sample (N = 185; IC+ = 45; IC−= 140) excluding participants with psychiatric or neurological diagnoses. First, we examinedwhether IC representations were spatially anchored within PPS (Peripersonal Anchoring). Second,we assessed whether IC experiences were predominantly reported from an embodied, first-personor third-person perspective. Third, we tested whether individuals reporting childhood ICs show agreater adult propensity for presence-related experiences (Continuity of Agent Propensity).Results supported all three predictions. Most spatial distance reports (76.1%) fell within 70 cm ofthe body, with an overall median distance of 12 cm, consistent with PPS anchoring. IC experienceswere primarily reported from a first-person perspective (55.6%) and referenced to the body(88.9%). Furthermore, individuals with childhood ICs reported higher scores on the SensedPresence Questionnaire (SenPQ; 15 items, excluding Item 7 due to cross-loading) duringadulthood, whereas dissociative tendencies did not differ between groups. Exploratory logisticregression identified perceived presence proneness as the only significant predictor of IC history.Together, these findings suggest that both adult FP and childhood IC experiences may be groundedin the spatial organization of the bodily action field and reflect a stable disposition for internallygenerated social-agent representations.