Abstract
Jambon et al. (in press) seek to evaluate Yucel et al.’s (2022) proposal that fairness may be psychologically distinct from other, prototypical moral norms, and, in line with Social Domain Theory (SDT), to reassert fairness’ place within the moral domain. Here, we show that Jambon et al.’s own data and arguments, alongside a reanalysis of Yucel et al.’s (2022) data, undermine rather than support Jambon et al.’s claims. Across studies, fairness reliably differs from harm on the very measures (criterion judgments, justifications) the authors treat as diagnostic for establishing moral status. This pattern goes unaddressed by Jambon et al. in part because of inconsistent evidentiary standards as well as circular reasoning that assumes the very conclusion it seeks to demonstrate. These findings raise a more fundamental question: As currently conceived under SDT, to what extent does the “moral domain” constitute a psychologically coherent category?