Abstract
The purpose of the article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet-era literature on the policy of the leadership of Poland and Romania towards the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic interned in the camps of these countries. The methodological basis of the study is the principles of historicism, objectivity, systematicity and continuity, which involve the identification and comprehensive study of the source material, taking into account the historical context of its formation. In solving the tasks set, the author used general scientific and special research methods: historiographic analysis and synthesis, historical and comparative, chronological, retrospective, etc. The scientific novelty of the work is that it analyzes, on the basis of an integrated approach, the state of study in Soviet historiography of the policy of the leadership of Poland and Romania in 1921-1924 regarding the interned Army of the UPR, and clarifies the conceptual approaches and methods used by Soviet historians to reconstruct this policy. Conclusions. An analysis of the works of Soviet historians has shown that they were extremely biased in their coverage of the motives that guided Poland and Romania in providing asylum to interned Ukrainian soldiers. These countries were defined as satellites of the great imperialist powers, dependent on them in financial, economic, military and political terms, and used as support bases for political banditry. Despite being rich in factual material, the works of Soviet historians did not provide objective coverage of the evolution of the policy of the government of Poland and Romania toward the interned Army of the UPR. The so-called class principle, which they were forced to strictly adhere to, led to the consideration of this issue only in the context of the Soviet government's struggle against "world imperialism," which in its desire to overcome the socialist system in the Soviet state tried to use the interned Ukrainian military. Facts related to this problem were selected by Soviet historians in a biased manner and assessed apologetically. A number of aspects of this problem were completely ignored.