Abstract
Purpose: This study investigated the role of professional enablers in facilitating unfettered money
laundering for politically exposed persons (PEPs) and the resultant systemic impact on anti-money
laundering (AML) compliance in host countries. It addressed gaps in literature on how legal,
accounting, and banking professionals jointly weaken AML systems, and how political
interference moderates that relationship.
Design/Methodology/Approach: A quantitative, cross-sectional survey design underpinned by
positivist epistemology was adopted. Data were collected via a structured online questionnaire
from 395 purposively selected professionals comprising lawyers, accountants, bankers,
compliance officers, and regulators/FIU officers across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and
other regions. The instrument measured Professional Enabler Activity Intensity, Systemic Impact
on AML Compliance, Ineffective Countermeasures, and Political Interference. Data were
analysed using SPSS v29 and SmartPLS 4.0. Reliability was confirmed with Cronbach’s α > .84
and AVE > .59. Hypotheses were tested using multiple regression, Pearson correlation, one-way
ANOVA with Tukey HSD post-hoc, and PLS-SEM moderation.
Findings: All five null hypotheses were rejected at p < .001. Legal, accounting, and banking
means each significantly weakened AML compliance, explaining 52% of variance in systemic
impact, R² = .52, f² = 1.08. Banking means had the strongest effect β = .31. Ineffective
countermeasures were strongly correlated with unfettered money laundering prevalence, r = .61.
Significant occupational differences existed, F(4,390) = 8.73, p < .001, with lawyers and bankers
reporting the highest enabler activity. Systemic impact was significantly higher in Africa than
Europe, F(4,390) = 6.94, p < .001. Political interference significantly moderated the enabler
impact relationship, interaction β = .19, p < .001, such that enabler activity caused 82% greater
systemic damage under high political interference.Theoretical Implications: Findings validate Agency Theory, Institutional Theory, Differential
Association Theory, Regulatory Arbitrage Theory, and State Capture Theory. The study proposes
a “Triadic Enabler Model” showing that unfettered money laundering is a political economy
problem of enabler incentives and state capture, not merely technical AML failure.
Practical Implications: FATF Recommendation 22 should be amended to limit legal privilege for
PEP structuring. FIUs require operational independence from executive control. Professional
bodies should introduce personal liability for members facilitating PEP laundering. Banks must
prohibit correspondent relationships with high-risk jurisdictions absent independent CDD
verification.
Originality/Value: This is the first study to empirically quantify and compare enabler activity
across occupations and continents using a validated 60-item Professional Enabler Scale. It
introduces political interference as a measured moderator of AML failure, answering calls in
literature to include the “missing politics variable.”
Limitations: The study used perception-based, cross-sectional data from non-probability
sampling. Future research should triangulate with forensic network analysis of leaked data and
adopt longitudinal designs.