Abstract
The exercise of executive powers has long dominated political discourse, tracing back to the
evolution of organised societies. Across various systems of government, states have consistently
grappled with the legality, legitimacy, and boundaries of executive authority, giving rise to
foundational doctrines such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, and checks and balances
in modern democratic governance. Nigeria currently operates a presidential system characterised
by a constitutional separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial arms.
Nevertheless, concerns persist regarding the overreach of executive authority, often manifesting in
what many describe as executive recklessness. In contrast, the United Kingdom practices the
Westminster parliamentary model, which is marked by a fusion of powers between the executive
and legislature. Executive functions are discharged by the Prime Minister and Cabinet—who are
themselves members of Parliament, creating blurred lines between law-making and execution. This
structural fusion often enables a concentration of executive influence, with its extent largely
shaped by the political dominance or assertiveness of the individual Prime Minister. This study
undertook an analysis of the foundations and theoretical basis of executive powers in both Nigeria
and the United Kingdom, focusing on their constitutional, statutory, political, and systemic
mechanisms. Employing the doctrinal research methodology, the study relied on primary sources
such as national constitutions and statutes, and secondary sources including textbooks, journal
articles, and credible online materials. Findings showed that even under the presidential system
where there is clear boundaries for executive authority, there are frequent instances of boundarycrossing—some constitutionally provided, while others are politically engineered. The study
further observed that in both jurisdictions, existing checks and balances are often insufficient to
effectively restrain executive excesses. Notably, it found that executive influence over sensitive
areas—such as the appointment of judges and electoral officials—poses risks to institutional
neutrality. Accordingly, the study recommended that such appointments be subjected to greater
legislative scrutiny or transferred to more independent bodies. In the Nigerian context,
constitutional amendments are proposed to empower the legislature to question the President on
policy matters at regular intervals. It also calls for reforms aimed at strengthening the electoral
system to ensure transparency and public trust, reinforcing the independence of the legislature,
and discouraging executive dominance in inter-branch relations.