Pike, Reichenbach, and others, correctly hold that a God whose very nature prevents him from doing evil cannot properly be regarded as morally good.But they fail to show just how God's moral goodness can be effectively independent of his ontological goodness, how God can be "significantly free" and so be morally praiseworthy.I argue that their contention calls for a greater modification of classical theism than they realize, i.e., for abandoning the traditional subordination of God's will to God's (supposedly necessary) goodness.I explore a way of reconceiving the relation of God's will to his nature, so that he actually can be morally praiseworthy, free either to obey or to violate his own moral law.Nelson Pike, Bruce Reichenbach, and others have argued that classical Christian theism holds an inadequate view of God's goodness in relation to God's freedom and power to do what is morally evil.)The New Testament Epistle of James, verse 13, states that "God cannot be tempted by evil"; the Church Fathers elaborated this theme as the doctrine of divine impeccability.On this foundation arose the classical view that God lacks the ability or creative power to bring about any morally reprehensible state of affairs.Pike argues that a God who could not do evil also could not be morally good, for refraining from doing evil is morally praiseworthy only because the one who refrains is able to do evil.On a religiously adequate notion of divine goodness, God can do moral evil but refrains, or freely chooses not to do it.Pike and Reichenbach have been subjected to thoughtful criticism.2 I shall take brief note of such criticism, although it is not my main purpose to defend them against it.I believe their general approach (hereafter often referred to as "Pike's position") is viable, but not in its present form and without elaboration of its fuller implications for our conception of God's nature and will.My chosen task here is not so much to defend Pike's position as it is to extend it.Pike and his supporters do not explain how to conceive of God as having the freedom to will, and the power to carry out, moral evil.After examining their views and a bit of the criticism, I shall explain why the traditional doctrine of God needs more extensive modification than they apparently realize.To make their conception of God's moral goodness feasible, they also need to revise the classical conception of God's will in relation to the con-FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 8 No.1 January
