Abstract
The global patent system operates under assumptions that have not been seriously revisited since the industrial age. Chief among them is the conviction that patents reliably measure innovation, that temporary monopolies incentivize disclosure, and that the inventor behind every filing is a human being acting with creative intent. This article challenges each of these assumptions by examining three structural failures of the contemporary patent regime. The first is the weaponization of patents by non-practicing entities and dominant technology corporations, which has transformed intellectual property from a shield for genuine invention into a strategic instrument of market control, litigation, and competitive exclusion. The second failure concerns the inability of existing legal frameworks to accommodate inventions generated by artificial intelligence systems, a problem made visible by the DABUS patent applications and their rejection across the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The third failure is the persistence of pharmaceutical monopolies that restrict access to life-saving treatments through evergreening strategies, excessive pricing, and aggressive enforcement of patent rights in developing countries. Drawing on historical analysis, comparative jurisdictional review, and a critical evaluation of emerging reform proposals, the article argues that these dysfunctions are not isolated malfunctions but predictable consequences of a legal architecture designed for a world that no longer exists. The article evaluates five structural reform proposals: sector-specific patent terms calibrated to the pace of technological change, layered rights contingent on demonstrated utility rather than mere filing, blockchain-based registries for transparent priority verification, dynamic licensing models that adjust exclusivity based on public interest considerations, and a sui generis category of protection for machine-generated inventions. The article concludes that incremental procedural adjustments are insufficient and that the patent system requires foundational restructuring to restore the balance between private reward and collective benefit that originally justified its existence.