Abstract
Introduction: The formulation of the legal definition of torture has sparked an ongoing debate concerning the relative weight of its three constitutive elements: the infliction of either physical or mental pain or suffering, its intentional character, and its specific purpose. Whilst some interpretations privilege intentionality as the central defining characteristic, others stipulate purpose as the decisive criterion for identifying torture. This article assesses whether the so-called “sexual conversion practices” satisfy these elements and examines the role of specific purpose as an interpretive criterion. Methods: The article adopts a doctrinal legal analysis within international human rights law, with particular attention to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights system, complemented by a forensic and contextual interpretive approach. Results: Sexual conversion practices may meet the constitutive elements of torture, particularly in contexts shaped by structural discrimination, where physical or psychological suffering is intentionally inflicted for discriminatory purposes. Discussion: Whereas specific purpose emerges as a central interpretive criterion, its analytical value is limited by its presence in other forms of ill-treatment, requiring renewed engagement with its role in legal interpretation.