Abstract
ABSTRACT On the definition of citizen in book III of Politics: Aristotle’s method between theoria, empeiria and the history of praxeis Any attempt to grasp Aristotle’s definition of the citizen in Book III of the Politics necessarily entails reflection on the method of his inquiry. It is method that Aristotle adopts within the domain of political science, and which he accordingly employs when his investigation turns to the citizen as the minimal unit of the city. What deserves particular emphasis is how Aristotle establishes with precision both the object of his inquiry – the polis conceived as a multitude of citizens – and its ultimate purpose: the identification of those who bear political responsibility and exercise sovereign power. The present analysis contends that Aristotle’s treatment cannot be fragmented: the definition of citizenship must be understood within the theoretical framework that hosts it, inseparably bound to the discussion of political responsibility and the sovereignty of citizens. Aristotle takes as his point of departure a contemporary political debate concerning who assumes responsibility for praxeis in the polis, and through this concrete framework develops his theoretical reflection. Close examination reveals the seamless interaction between theoria and empeiria in Aristotle’s procedure: the definition formulated in Chapter 1 undergoes continuous verification through the empirical data and historical cases examined in Chapter 2, notably including practices of colonization and naturalization. The citizen in the unqualified sense (haplos) is defined by the faculty (exousia) of exercising deliberative and judicial functions – functions which qualify participation in the sovereign body (kyrion) of the politeia. This definition retains its validity across different constitutional forms, thereby demonstrating Aristotle’s commitment to grounding theoretical analysis in the observation of actual poleis and their historical praxeis.