Abstract
Purpose
Japan’s crisis management has long been criticized for inefficiency, suggesting that existing analyses have overlooked deeper systematic issues. This study examines whether the primary inhibitors of Japan’s crisis management performance stem from formal “institutional characteristics” or informal “operational characteristics.”
Design/methodology/approach
A comparative case study approach was used to analyze the government’s response to three crises: the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident and the 2015 Japan Pension Service data breach. The analysis draws on an integrated theoretical framework combining the bureaucratic dysfunction theory, high-reliability organization theory and organizational learning theory.
Findings
Results show that entrenched operational pathologies – including a culture of responsibility avoidance, rigid sectionalism, passive information-gathering practices and the sidelining of technical expertise – consistently inhibited situational awareness, decision-making, coordination and effective use of expertise. For risk communication, institutional weaknesses and operational factors exerted equally strong and mutually reinforcing inhibitors.
Originality/value
The study demonstrates that Japan’s crisis management reforms remain constrained by superficial single-loop learning. It argues that meaningful improvement requires a shift to double-loop learning that challenges foundational cultural assumptions – particularly the presumed infallibility of the state – with direct implications for national security.